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The performance of a spoofing detection and mitigation 
technique that makes use of the directions of arrival 
(DOAs) information about the navigation signals has been 
assessed. The directions of arrival have been estimated by 
utilizing a miniaturized antenna array developed for the 
reception of Galileo navigation signals of the public 
regulated service in E1 and E6 frequency bands. The 
performance assessment has been performed by using 
realistic post-correlation data which were collected in 






The positioning and timing services provided by global 
navigation satellite systems (GNSSs), for example by the 
American NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS), 
may be strongly affected by the perturbations occurred in 
the radio propagation channel between a GNSS satellite 
and the user. Because of their extremely low power the 
GNSS navigation signals can be easily jammed, on 
purpose or unintentionally, which poses the problem of 
radio frequency interference. Moreover, since the 
structure of the ranging signals and navigation data is 
open to public, it is not only possible to distort the 
reception of GNSS signals in a brute-force way but also to 
counterfeit the signals to make the user’s receiver 
generating false position and/or time. This kind of 
interference is commonly referenced in the literature as 
spoofing. Until recently because of its intentional nature, 
the spoofing threat was considered as relevant only for the 
military users of GNSS. However as our dependence on 




turns out that the spoofing problem is also of concern for 
the civil users. Especially strategically important 
infrastructures, such as electric power grids or mobile 
communications networks, are becoming increasingly 
dependent on the GNSS services. Spoofing is also an 
issue for safety-of-life applications like airplane landing 
or ship navigation in a harbor.  
 
A number of studies have been performed on finding 
solutions to the problem of GNSS spoofing, see for 
example [1], [2] and references herein. The most 
exhaustive solutions based on the cryptographic 
authentication of GNSS signals were proposed on the 
system level. These solutions may be introduced in the 
future as a part of the modernization programs of existing 
GNSSs.  
 
The solutions at the receiver level are easier to introduce 
in a short time frame in order to protect the most critical 
GNSS applications. In the user receiver, the authentic and 
spoofing signals can be discriminated by examining the 
signal amplitudes, frequency offsets and times-of-arrival. 
If the receiver utilizes multiple receive antennas the 
spatial properties of the signals can be additionally 
exploited. The typical strategies proposed for the spoofing 
detection in a multi-antenna receiver are as follows: 
- to use carrier phase measurements in order to detect 
if a signal tracked by the receiver arrives from a 
different direction as predicted from the user to 
satellite geometry [3]; 
- to use carrier phase measurements in order to detect 
if all or majority of signals tracked by the receiver 
arrive from a single direction corresponding to the 
single spoofing transmitter [4][5]; 
- to examine positioning solutions obtained when using 
signals of each antenna individually and detect the 
spoofing attack when the individual positioning 
solutions tend to coincide [6].  
The detection in spatial domain can be effectively used 
with various types of spoofing, including so called 
meaconing. With this type of spoofing the GNSS signals 
are simply received and re-transmitted in order to force a 
victim receiver to report the position of the meaconer 
receiving antenna.  
 
The technique for spoofing detection proposed by the 
authors in [7] is also based on the signal discrimination in 
spatial domain. It is assumed that the spatial information 
is available in form of estimated directions of arrival. 
Such information can be obtained by using dedicated 
array signal processing techniques for DOA estimation 
such as MUSIC or ESPRIT [8] and is often used for 
constraining an adaptive beamforming process. Also 
assuming that the attitude of the antenna array is unknown 
the spoofing detection was treated as a joint problem of 
the spoofing detection and the estimation of the array 
attitude.  
 
The performance of the proposed technique has been first 
evaluated by means of numerical simulations [7] and later 
by processing the data collected in field trials where a 
GNSS repeater was used to emulate the meaconing attack 
[9][10]. The results reported in [9] and [10] demonstrate 
good spoofing detection performance in static and 
dynamic user scenarios when using a 2-by-2 uniform 
rectangular array with a half-wavelength spacing, 0.5𝜆,  
of the antenna elements on L1 carrier frequency. In the 
later work, in order to minimize the antenna footprint a 
new design of the array has been developed. The element 
spacing in the new design is reduced to 0.34𝜆 while the 
side-length of array reduced by factor two from 270 mm 
to 135 mm. The size reduction of the antenna array 
generally leads to stronger mutual electromagnetic 
coupling between array elements and a lower overall 
antenna gain. In this paper we report the results of the 
practical field tests of the spoofing detection when using 
the miniaturized antenna array affected by the mentioned 
limiting effects 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The first 
section describes the design and characteristics of the 
miniaturized antenna array. The second section briefly 
summarizes the concept of the antenna-based joint 
attitude estimation and spoofing detection approach which 
is described in details in [7]. In the next two sections the 
results on the spoofing/meaconing detection in realistic 
scenarios by using both the nominal-size and the 
miniaturized antenna arrays are presented: the third 
section focuses on the false alarm performance in an 
interference-free open-sky scenario, while the fourth 
section describes the results obtained by post-processing 
the data collected in a field test where a simple GPS 
repeater was used to simulate a meaconing attack. The 
summary of the results and conclusions will be given in 
the last section. 
 
 
MINIATURIZED ANTENNA ARRAY 
 
The miniaturized 2-by-2 antenna array was developed in 
the frame of BaSE (Bavarian SEcurity receiver) project 
[11], whose goal is a flexible demonstrator platform of a 
robust user receiver for the Galileo public regulated 
service (PRS). The array is designed to receive the signals 
of Galileo PRS with full bandwidth in the E1 and E6 
frequency bands allocated for the service. Figure 1 shows 
the miniaturized array together with the “full-size” E1/E6 
antenna array where the typical element spacing of 0.5𝜆 
(referred to the E1 carrier frequency) is used. The side-
length of the ground plane of the miniaturized array is 
only 135 mm while the side-length of full-size array is 
270 mm. The significantly smaller footprint was achieved 
by miniaturizing the antenna elements of the array with 
the help of the material ROGERS RO6010 with a 
relatively high dielectric constant value of about 10.  
 
The double frequency operation of the array is achieved 
by exploiting a stacked patch antenna technology as 
shown in Figure 2. The design of the array elements is 
based on the use of capacitively-coupled feeding of 
????
individual patches and application of relatively thick 
substrate material (7.5mm in total for the radiation part) 
that allows reaching the full bandwidth coverage required 
for the wideband Galileo PRS signals. 
 
 
Figure 1: Miniaturized antenna array (left) and  
full-size array with half-wavelength spacing (right) 
 
 
Figure 2: Design of array element 
 
In this work the GPS L1 in air signals were used by a 
multi-antenna GNSS receiver [12] to collect the correlator 
output data for post-processing. Therefore only the upper 
higher-frequency patches and the E1 outputs of the 
antenna array elements were used. The element spacing of 
65 mm (see Figure 3) in the miniaturized array 
corresponds to 0.34𝜆 at the L1 carrier frequency of 
1575.42 MHz. The elements spacing in the full size array 
is 95 mm which is about 0.5𝜆 at the L1 frequency.  
 
 
Figure 3: Geometry of miniaturized antenna array 
 
The tighter arrangement of the array elements results in 
their stronger electromagnetic coupling and larger 
variations of the gain and phase reception patterns 
between the elements. This can be observed in Figure 4 
and Figure 5 where the gain and phase radiation patterns 
of the array elements for both miniaturized and full-size 
arrays are presented for comparison reasons. These 
patterns were obtained by full-wave electromagnetic 




a) miniaturized array 
 
 
b) full-size array 
Figure 4: Gain patterns of array elements 
 
 
ANTENNA-BASED JOINT ATTITUDE 
ESTIMATION AND SPOOFING DETECTION 
 
In this section we give a short overview of the technique 
for joint estimation of the antenna attitude and spoofing 
detection that was presented by the authors in [7]. This 
technique is based on the use of estimated directions of 
arrival (DOAs) for discriminating between the spoofing 
and authentic GNSS signals. The estimated DOAs which 
are provided in the local antenna coordinate system are 
then checked against the directions to the satellites 
predicted by using the ephemeris data of the GNSS 
navigation message. These predicted directions are given 
in the local user’s east-north-up (ENU) coordinate frame. 
Under conditions without spoofing and meaconing, the 
expected DOAs and the ones estimated in the antenna 




a) miniaturized array 
 
 
b) full-size array 
Figure 5: Phase patterns of array elements 
 
The relationship between the 𝑁DOA DOAs in the 
estimated and predicted data sets can be mathematically 
formulated as follows: 
 
𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐 = 𝐑(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 + 𝐍 (1) 
 
where 
𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐  is a [3 × 𝑁DOA] matrix composed of 𝑁DOA unit 
vectors of directional cosines describing the directions 
of arrival of satellite signals in the local coordinate 
frame of the antenna array;  
𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 is a [3 × 𝑁DOA] matrix composed of unit vectors of 
directional cosines corresponding to the predicted 
DOAs of the satellite signals in the user ENU 
coordinate frame; 
𝐑(𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦) is a [3 × 3] unitary rotation matrix (see [13], 
p.441) describing to the attitude of the antenna array 
defined by three Eulers angles: roll 𝑟, pitch 𝑝 and yaw 
𝑦. These angles are referred to the user local ENU 
coordinate frame; 
𝐍 is a [3 × 𝑁DOA] matrix describing the measurement 
noise effect. Further for simplicity, we assume that the 
noise components follow Gaussian distributions with 
zero means and, in general case, different standard 
deviations 𝜎1,𝜎2, … ,𝜎𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐴.   
The solution for the antenna attitude can be obtained by 
solving (1) for Euler angles (𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦) in the least squares 
sense: 
 (?̂?, ?̂?, 𝑦�) = arg
𝑟,𝑝,𝑦 min‖𝐑(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 − 𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐‖2 . (2) 
 
An iterative way of solving the least squares problem (2) 
is presented in [7].  
 
The quality of the solution for the antenna attitude can be 
assessed using the sum of squares of errors (SSE) test 
statistics that is similar to how it is used with receiver 
autonomous integrity monitoring (RAIM) techniques. The 
SSE metric is defined as follows 
 
𝑆𝑆𝐸 = trace{[𝐑(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 − 𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐]T ⋅ 
 𝐑𝑁−1[𝐑(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 − 𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐]}, (3) 
 
where the inverse of the covariance matrix of the 
measurement noise 𝐑𝑁−1   is used for normalizing 
individual residuals of the least squares solution. Further, 
we assume that the individual DOA measurement errors 
are Gaussian and not correlated with each other and the 
matrix 𝐑𝑁 is a diagonal matrix consisting of the error 
variances, 𝜎12,𝜎22, … ,𝜎𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐴2 . 
 
As shown in [7], if no systematic offsets observed 
between the measured and predicted DOAs of the GNSS 
signals, the 𝑆𝑆𝐸 metric defined by (3) follows a central 
chi-squared distribution with 𝑘 =  (2𝑁DOA − 3) degrees 
of freedom. In another case, if all or some of the 
measured DOAs are biased with respects to predicted 
DOAs, the 𝑆𝑆𝐸 metric follows a non-central chi-squared 
distribution with the same number of degrees of freedom 
as above but with some non-zero non-centrality parameter 
𝜆: 
 H0(no error):  𝑆𝑆𝐸~𝜒2(𝑘) H1(error):        𝑆𝑆𝐸~𝜒′2(𝑘, 𝜆) 
𝑘 =  (2𝑁DOA − 3) 









Δ𝑛 is the bias in the 𝑛-th DOA measurement, this bias 
is expressed as a spatial angle 𝜓𝑛 between two 
direction cosines vectors of the measured DOA 
𝒅�𝑙𝑜𝑐,𝑛 and the predicted “almanac” DOA 𝒅�𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑛:  
 
Δ𝑛 = 𝜓𝑛 = arccos�𝒅�𝑙𝑜𝑐,𝑛T 𝒅�𝑒𝑛𝑢,𝑛�, (5) 
 
𝜎𝑛 is the standard deviation of the 𝑛-th DOA 
measurement error given in units of the spatial 
angle 𝜓𝑛.  
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The detection of the systematic biases in DOA 
measurements can be carried out by using the Neyman-
Pearson criterion, i.e. by setting a threshold for the SSE 
test metric defined by some desired false alarm rate. The 
presence of systematic biases can then serve as one of the 
indications for a spoofer / meaconing attack.  
 
Another metric for spoofing/meaconing detection we use 
later in this work is based on the observation of the 
correlations between the single estimated DOAs [10]. 
Strong correlation between the majority of the directions 
of arrival gives the indication that the corresponding 
signals are likely to originate from a single source but not 
from the GNSS satellites in orbit.  
 
In the next two sections, both SSE and DOA-correlation 
test metrics will be applied to the recorded data of field 
tests without and with a simulated meaconing attack.  
 
 
PERFORMANCE IN INTERFERENCE-FREE 
SCENARIO 
 
Preliminary tests under interference-free signal conditions 
have been performed at DLR Oberpfaffenhofen location. 
The miniaturized and full-size antenna array, one at a 
time, were installed on the roof of the DLR Institute of 
communications and navigation (see Figure 6) and 
connected to the experimental multi-antenna receiver 
GALANT [12]. The experimental receiver was used to 
collect the data blocks of post-correlation samples. Each 
block of 4x50 samples corresponds to 50 ms observation 
time. Two such blocks per second were collected for each 
GPS L1 satellite being tracked by the receiver. The 
collected data blocks were then post-processed with 
unitary ESPRIT for the direction of arrival estimation.  
 
 
Figure 6: Roof installation of antenna array 
 
The obtained DOAs of satellite signals were used for 
performing the estimation of the attitude of the antenna 
array. The rate of the attitude estimation was kept the 
same as the rate of the DOA estimation, i.e. 2 Hz. For the 
assessment of the DOA estimation error, mean antenna 
attitude angles (i.e. pitch, roll and yaw) have been 
obtained by averaging the single-epoch estimations over 
6 hours data block. The time evolution of the single-epoch 
estimations of the Euler angles are presented in Figure 7. 
It can be observed that the standard deviations of the 
estimated Euler angles grow significantly when we 
moved from the full-size array (Figure 7, a) to the 
miniaturized one (Figure 7, b).  
 
 
a) full-size array 
 
b) miniaturized array 
Figure 7: Estimated Euler angles of antenna array attitude 
 
The mean errors of DOA estimation given in terms of a 
spatial angle between two unit vectors describing the 
estimated and reference directions are shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
a) full-size array 
 
a) miniaturized array 
Figure 8: Mean angular error of DOA estimation 
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The computed mean and standard deviation of the DOA 
estimation error in terms of azimuth and elevations angles 
are presented in Figure 9 for the full-size antenna array 
and in Figure 10 for the miniaturized array. For 
convenience, the error values in these figures are grouped 
by several elevation clusters. 
 
 
c) estimation error of elevation 
 
d) estimation error of azimuth 
Figure 9: DOA estimation error in terms of azimuth and 
elevation angles, full-size array 
 
 
a) estimation error of elevation 
 
b) estimation error of azimuth 
Figure 10: DOA estimation error in terms of azimuth and 
elevation angles, miniaturized array 
 
As can be seen from Figure 8, Figure 9 and Figure 10 the 
miniaturized antenna array delivers larger errors of the 
DOA estimation. To a big part this is because of the 
reduction of the aperture size. Another reasons for this 
effect is also a stronger model mismatch in the ESPRIT 
algorithm, which assumes rotation invariance in the 
reception patterns of the array elements.  
 
The results for spoofing detection metrics obtained both 
with the full-size and miniaturized arrays are presented in 
Figure 11 and Figure 12, correspondingly. It can be 
observed, that the values of the detection metrics are 
comparable between the two array options. The relative 
growth of the DOA estimation error in case of the 
miniaturized antenna array was accounted in the weighted 




a) SSE test metric 
 
b) DOA correlation test metric 
Figure 11: Spoofing detection metrics,  
full-size array used 
 
 
a) SSE test metric 
 
b) DOA correlation test metric 
Figure 12: Spoofing detection metrics,  
miniaturized array used 
 
 
PERFORMANCE UNDER SIMULATED 
MEACONING ATTACK 
 
The field tests with a simple GPS L1 repeater simulating a 
meaconing attack were carried out in the area of the 
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Galileo test environment (GATE) in Berchtesgaden, 
Germany. The measurement set-up of the field tests is 
shown in Figure 13. The data used for post-processing 
and analysis were collected in the same way as during the 
preliminary tests in DLR Oberpfaffenhofen. The all-in-
view active receive antenna of the GPS repeater was 
placed at a distance of 77 m from the measurements 
vehicle where the GALANT receiver was installed. The 
transmit antenna of the repeater was mounted on a mast of 
8.6 m height. The slant distance between the miniaturized 
antenna array installed on the roof of the measurement 
vehicle and the repeater transmit antenna, a calibrated 
horn antenna, was 6.2 m. An additional low-noise 
amplifier was used to compensate for cabling losses. The 
power of the re-transmitted GPS L1 signals could be 




a) view of measurement van and repeater transmit antenna 
 
b) geometry of repeater set-up 
Figure 13: Measurement set-up 
 
The effect of the re-transmitted signals of the GPS 
repeater on the positioning solution in the receiver is 
shown in Figure 14 for two different values of attenuation 
values: 0 dB (Figure 14a) and 10 dB (Figure 14b).  
 
 
a) stronger repeater signals, no additional attenuation 
 
b) weaker repeater signals, attenuation of 10 dB 
Figure 14: Effect of repeater on position solution of 
experimental multi-antenna receiver,  
no spoofing mitigation activated 
 
The results for spoofing detection metrics in case of the 
stronger and weaker repeater signals and the miniaturized 
antenna array used by the multi-antenna receiver are 
presented in Figure 15 and Figure 16, respectively. The 
corresponding detection flags issued by the detection 
algorithm are shown in Figure 17.  
 
 
a) SSE test metric 
 
b) DOA correlation 
Figure 15: Spoofing detection metrics,  




a) SSE test metric 
 
b) DOA correlation 
Figure 16: Spoofing detection metrics,  
weaker repeater signals 
 
It can be observed in Figure 17 that the stronger repeater 
signals can be easily detected all the time they are 
radiated. The weaker repeater signals can be detected 
most of time with the help of at least one of the utilized 
test metrics. Some portion of time, however, the detection 
is not possible because of disturbed signal tracking and 
unavailability of the DOA measurements (see Figure 18). 
 
 
a) stronger repeater signals 
 
b) weaker repeater signals 
Figure 17: Spoofing detection flags 
 
 
Figure 18: Status of spoofing detection in case of weak 
signals of GPS repeater 
 
The estimated direction to the source of spoofing signals, 
i.e. in the case of GPS repeater – the direction to the 
repeater transmit antenna, is shown in Figure 19. This 
direction is estimated by using the average of the 
remarkably strong correlated DOAs which are identified 
in the spoofing detection process. As it can be seen in 
Figure 19b, the weak interfering signals result in the 




a) stronger repeater signals   b) weaker repeater signals 
Figure 19: Estimated direction to spoofing source 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper the performance of the spoofing detection 
technique [7] while using a miniaturized antenna array 
has been studied. The performance analysis was based on 
the post-processing of data-blocks with the PRN-
correlator outputs collected by using a multi-antenna GPS 
receiver in field tests under realistic signal conditions. 
The obtained results demonstrate that the DOA estimation 
performance degrades as the aperture of the antenna array 
becomes smaller. Consequently, the larger errors in the 
DOA estimation affect correspondingly the array attitude 
estimation. The field tests with the simulated meaconing 
attacks demonstrate that the spoofing detection with the 
miniaturized antenna array performed well and not much 
different than with the full-size antenna array. This is due 
to the fact that the detection is based on the identification 
of really strong signal anomalies in the spatial domain, 
which is still possible even with a degraded DOA 
estimation performance.  
 
In the reported work, we used the unitary ESPRIT 
algorithm for DOA estimation. The signal model utilized 
by this technique is based on the assumption of array 
elements with identical characteristics. Since the mutual 
coupling between the array elements results in 
significantly different reception patterns, the performance 
of the DOA estimation degrades due to the model 
mismatch. This problem can be avoided by using other 
DOA estimation methods, such as MUSIC and maximum 
likelihood estimators, which allow accounting for the 
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